

Study on the Cost Control Model and Improvement Countermeasures of Human Resources in Property Enterprises

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Abstract: The property management industry faces structural issues from rising labor costs and rigid fees, with human resources consuming over 60% of operating expenses. Key challenges include mismatches between hierarchical structures and project flexibility, service risks from excessive outsourcing, tensions between fixed staffing and fluctuating demand, and inefficient “zombie assets.” Institutionally, pyramid-shaped organizations hinder market-based resource allocation, and flawed performance systems misalign incentives with efficiency. Market conflicts arise from mandatory minimum wage hikes versus frozen fees, and talent wars disrupt the sector’s low-margin positioning. Risks include SME service failures harming brand reputation and high frontline turnover destabilizing delivery. Recommendations: (1) Flatten management via a “headquarters-cluster-project” model. (2) Standardize outsourcing to focus on core functions. (3) Adopt diversified employment models. (4) Build digital HR systems with tiered early-warning mechanisms to manage risk and drive high-quality development.

Keywords: property enterprises; human resource cost control; flattened management; diversified employment; digital transformation

1. Introduction

As China’s economy has entered a new normal development stage, the property management industry is undergoing profound functional transformation and structural remodeling. The traditional extensive management model characterized by scale expansion accompanied by staff expansion has proven unsustainable, and the industry is progressively reverting to the fundamental principle of “service orientation with people as the core.” This transformation reflects the core concept of high-quality development within China’s service sector in the new era and provides direction for establishing long-term mechanisms for property management fee pricing while promoting healthy and sustainable industry development (Wang & Li). The transformation exhibits three major characteristics: first, the conversion of development momentum from incremental expansion to stock optimization, with refined management and lean operations emerging as new growth drivers. Second, the expansion of industrial boundaries, extending from traditional residential property to encompass commercial office property, medical property, industrial park property, and other composite business formats. Third,

the attenuation of labor-intensive attributes, as smart property technologies become increasingly prevalent, labor cost leverage continues to decline, and business models revert to technology-enabled operational logic. Throughout this transformation process, regional differentiation patterns are becoming increasingly pronounced, with first-tier cities taking the lead in entering the smart property era, while third- and fourth-tier cities continue to grapple with the pressures of labor cost rigidity and fee increase difficulties (Zhang &Liu).

Property enterprises, as quintessential labor-intensive service organizations, experience human resource costs constituting more than 60% of total operating expenditures. The structural contradiction between “minimum wage increases and social security base adjustments versus fee increase difficulties” has emerged as the core constraint restricting enterprise development(Chen&Yang). From an economic perspective, the transformation between traditional and new growth drivers represents a crucial task for property enterprises seeking quality and efficiency improvements(Liu&Zhao). Technological innovation drives changes in employment structure while imposing new requirements for talent cultivation. However, structural contradictions arising from uneven frontline staff quality have exposed certain enterprises to the risk of “decoupling” between cost control and service quality. From a demographic standpoint, by 2025, China’s aging trend has intensified, urban labor supply has reached an inflection point, and the proportion of employees aged over 50 in the property industry has exceeded 30%, creating a positive feedback loop of “aging employees leading to service quality decline” (Wu & Zheng). The interaction between demographic changes and industrial transformation ensures that human resource cost control in property enterprises exhibits not only common characteristics shared by the service industry but also specific patterns of rigidity and volatility.

At present, China’s property market faces the dual challenges of “preventing service quality deterioration” and “constructing new business models.” An in-depth analysis of property enterprises, which bear both economic significance and transformation pressures, will yield policy insights extending beyond individual enterprises and provide Chinese solutions for high-quality development within the property industry in the new era.

2. Diagnosis of the Development Status of Human Resource Cost Control in Property Enterprises

2.1 Operational Characteristics of Human Resource Costs

2.1.1 Cost Structure Rigidity: The Paradox of Staff Salary Proportions Coexisting with Social Security Contribution Pressures

The human resource costs of Chinese property enterprises exhibit typical structural rigidity characteristics. According to statistics from 60 listed property enterprises in 2023, over 60% of enterprises reported human resource costs exceeding 40% of total expenditures, with 19 enterprises recording proportions surpassing 50%, forming an “inflection point of labor cost rigidity”. In terms of cost composition, staff salaries account for approximately 70%-80% of human resource costs, while

social security and welfare expenses constitute 20%-30%. This structure demonstrates “dual rigidity” features: on one hand, minimum wage standards undergo annual adjustments, and social security contribution bases increase progressively. Taking Shandong Province as an illustrative case, from 2020 to 2024, the minimum wage standard increased at an average annual rate of 5.2%, while the lower limit of social security contributions rose by 6.8% year-on-year, significantly exceeding the growth rate of property management fees (averaging less than 2%). On the other hand, the pricing mechanism for property management fees exhibits rigidity. According to the Pricing Mechanism for Property Management Fees, adjustments to property fees require consent from more than two-thirds of property owners, yet in actual practice, the success rate for fee increases remains below 15%. This “upper rigidity combined with lower elasticity” mechanism traps property enterprises in a “cost-push alongside profit-squeeze” dilemma. In extreme cases, the labor cost ratio for certain older residential projects has exceeded 90%, pushing operating cash flow to the brink of disruption.

More profound is the “institutional trap” surrounding social security contributions. According to the Social Insurance Law, enterprises must pay social insurance for their employees in full and on time. However, the property industry features a high proportion of flexible employees, with numerous grassroots positions such as cleaners and security guards predominantly filled by rural migrant workers exhibiting high mobility. Surveys indicate that in county-level markets, the social security coverage rate among property companies falls below 40%, with some enterprises attempting to reduce labor costs by “changing the employment entity” (utilizing labor dispatch) or “controlling contribution bases” (paying social security according to minimum standards). Such practices not only entail legal compliance risks but also exacerbate workforce instability, creating a vicious cycle of “low social security leading to high mobility resulting in low service quality” (Sun & Zhou).

2.1.2 Management Model Lag: Insufficient Refinement in the Transition from Extensive Expansion to Lean Operations

The human resource management model of property enterprises generally exhibits characteristics described as “three excesses and three deficiencies.” First, there are excessive levels with insufficient efficiency. Traditional property enterprises predominantly adopt a pyramid structure comprising “headquarters-regional company-project department-team,” with management levels typically reaching 5-6 tiers. Taking a leading property enterprise in Shandong as an example, its management span is merely 1:4.8, far below the 1:8 to 1:10 level observed in international advanced service enterprises. Excessive hierarchical levels lead to inefficient information transmission, with policy communication from headquarters to the front line requiring an average of 7-10 days and distortion rates reaching as high as 30%. Second, there are excessive positions with insufficient coordination. According to the National Occupational Classification Code of Property Management Services, property enterprises involve more than 20 types of positions. However, in actual operation, the boundaries between positions remain overly rigid, rendering flexible deployment difficult. In an investigation of a project in Jinan, the utilization rate of cleaners was merely 62%, while the idling rate of security guards reached as high as 35%, creating a contradiction between “busy workers and idle workers.” Third, there is excessive reliance on experience with insufficient data utilization. Most enterprises depend on project managers’ personal experience for personnel allocation, lacking scientific quantitative standards. Research indicates that fewer than 20% of property enterprises have established a man-hour quota system, and fewer than 15% have implemented dynamic scheduling based on workload.

2.1.3 Worsening Demographic Support: The Vicious Cycle of Aging Frontline Staff and Increasing Recruitment Difficulty

The demographic structure of frontline staff in the property industry faces dual challenges. On one hand, the aging trend is pronounced. According to surveys, in county-level markets within Shandong Province, the proportion of security guards and cleaners aged over 50 has reached 47% and 63% respectively, while in some resource-exhausted cities (such as Zibo and Zaozhuang), the proportion of

employees aged over 55 reaches as high as 28%. Aging employees introduce three major problems: first, declining physical fitness makes it difficult to meet emergency response requirements; second, lagging skill updates hinder adaptation to smart device operations; third, increased health risks result in work-related injury incidence among employees over 50 being 2.3 times that of younger and middle-aged groups. On the other hand, recruitment difficulty increases year by year. The property industry has long occupied the bottom rung of the occupational reputation ladder, with the willingness index of young people to engage in grassroots property positions being merely 0.37 (with 1 as the benchmark). In economically developed cities such as Qingdao and Jinan, the vacancy rate for security guards exceeds 25%, with some projects experiencing “six months with guards on duty followed by six months without guards.” More critically, grassroots employee attrition exhibits a “two-speed loss” characteristic: the average annual turnover rate in core urban areas is 35%, while in suburban projects it reaches as high as 62%, creating a vicious circle of “high loss leading to recruitment difficulties resulting in quality decline leading to higher loss.”

2.2 Key Challenges in Human Resource Cost Control

2.2.1 Predicament of Business Outsourcing: Trade-off between Cost Reduction and Quality Risk

Business outsourcing has emerged as an important means for property enterprises to control human resource costs, yet it simultaneously entails significant service quality risks. According to data from listed property enterprises, from 2021 to 2023, the proportion of outsourcing costs in enterprises such as Yuexiu Service and Jingfa Property increased year by year, while the proportion of employee costs decreased correspondingly [3]. However, outsourcing practices have revealed three major risks: first, deviation in quality control. Following outsourcing, enterprises transform from “direct managers” to “contract supervisors,” with service quality largely dependent on the professional level and integrity of outsourcing companies. Taking cleaning services in Qingdao as an example, after adopting a full outsourcing model, the cleaning pass rate decreased from 92% to 78%, while the number of owner complaints increased by 2.3 times. More critically, some outsourcing companies reduce costs by “reducing staff and positions” and “employing unqualified personnel,” rendering service quality difficult to guarantee. Second, hidden compliance risks. Labor dispatch companies exhibit uneven qualifications, with some small outsourcing companies failing to standardize social security payments. Once labor disputes occur, property enterprises, as actual employers, often bear joint liability. Surveys indicate that over the past three years, more than 30% of property enterprises have experienced labor arbitration due to outsourcing issues. Third, failure of cost control. Although outsourcing can reduce explicit costs in the short term, the “agency costs” associated with outsourcing cannot be ignored over the long term. A project in Jinan outsourced security services, with the contract amount being 200,000 yuan lower than the cost of self-owned personnel. However, due to the lack of effective supervision mechanisms, actual quality fell significantly below standards, ultimately necessitating additional quality inspection personnel, resulting in actual total costs exceeding the original self-owned plan by 8%.

2.2.2 Failure of Performance Appraisal: The Deviation between Incentive Mechanisms and Corporate Efficiency

The performance appraisal system of property enterprises generally confronts the dilemma of “zombie indicators” coexisting with “short-term effects.” First, there is deviation in assessment indicator selection. Most enterprises adopt traditional KPI assessments, focusing on “process indicators” such as attendance rates and task completion rates, while neglecting “result indicators” such as owner satisfaction and fee collection rates. Taking a property company in Shandong as an example, its appraisal system establishes 27 KPIs, with process indicators accounting for 78%, while satisfaction surveys constitute merely 12%. The consequence is that employees become “busy with process while ignoring results.” Even when assessments are passed, owner satisfaction continues to decline. Second, incentive mechanisms exhibit short-termism. Some enterprises attempt to reduce labor costs by

“cutting salaries and benefits,” which suppresses employee motivation. According to surveys, the average salary level of grassroots employees in property enterprises is merely 75% of the local social average wage, with performance-related components constituting less than 15%, rendering meaningful incentive effects difficult to achieve. In some counties within Heze City, the monthly salary of security guards is only 1,800 yuan, below the local minimum wage standard, resulting in turnover rates exceeding 70%. Third, application of assessment results remains insufficient. The performance appraisal system of most enterprises exists in isolation, lacking effective linkage with training, promotion, and salary adjustment. Research indicates that fewer than 20% of property enterprises have established a “performance-training-promotion” linkage mechanism, with performance appraisal results becoming “archival materials” rather than “management tools.”

2.2.3 Low Digital Penetration: The Gap between Technological Input and Actual Output

The digital transformation of property enterprises generally confronts the dilemma of “high investment accompanied by low return.” On one hand, technology application remains superficial. Many enterprises blindly follow trends in introducing smart systems, resulting in disconnects between systems and actual operations. Taking a well-known property enterprise in Qingdao as an example, it invested 3 million yuan in introducing a smart property management system. However, during actual use, due to complex operation and incomplete data, the actual usage rate fell below 30%, creating the phenomenon of “data smoke and mirrors”—the system operates, but the data is false. On the other hand, human-machine fit remains poor. The introduction of smart devices should theoretically reduce labor costs, but in actual operation, new maintenance positions are added. A property company in Jinan introduced 20 cleaning robots, which should have reduced 15 cleaning positions. However, due to frequent equipment failures requiring 5 maintenance personnel, actual labor cost savings reached only 30% of expectations. More importantly, the digital divide among employees remains pronounced. The proportion of frontline employees aged over 50 in the property industry exceeds 40%, and their acceptance of smart devices is generally low. A survey indicates that 67% of older employees exhibit resistance to smart patrol systems, believing that “using mobile phones to clock in is more troublesome than manual signing.”

3. Key Challenges and Deep-Rooted Conflicts

3.1 Institutional Barriers

3.1.1 Constraints of Organizational Structure: Slow Progress in Flattening Management Reform

The organizational structure of property enterprises has become the core shackle restricting the market-oriented allocation of human resources. Although modern enterprise management theories provide a theoretical basis for flattening management, pilot practices among property enterprises reveal three deep-seated contradictions: first, the rigidity of the centralization-decentralization balance. The current organizational model predominantly adopts a “strong headquarters coupled with weak project” structure, with headquarters concentrating decision-making power in recruitment, training, and compensation, resulting in projects lacking flexibility in personnel allocation. Taking a leading property group in Shandong as an example, its headquarters must approve any increase in project staffing, with the approval cycle averaging 15 working days, often missing the window period for responding to service needs. Second, insufficient financial empowerment. Flattening management requires corresponding financial decentralization, but most property enterprises implement “revenue and expenditure under two lines” management, with projects having no autonomy in human resource investment. In the case of an emergency support need in a Zibo project, the project manager had to apply to headquarters level by level, with the support team arriving only after owner complaints had escalated. Third, the talent structure proves inadequate for supporting flattening management. Flattened management places higher demands on the comprehensive quality of project managers, requiring them

to possess both professional skills and management capabilities. However, survey data indicates that more than 70% of property project managers in Shandong Province hold associate degrees or below, with fewer than 30% having received systematic management training, making it difficult to meet the quality requirements of flattening management.

3.1.2 Deficiencies in the Performance Appraisal System: Lack of Dynamic Adjustment Mechanism for Assessment Indicators

The performance appraisal system of property enterprises exhibits structural defects, highlighted by the absence of dynamic adjustment mechanisms and the disconnect between indicators and actual work. The current appraisal system displays “two extremes”: first, excessive quantification. Some enterprises pursue refinement of indicators, establishing dozens of KPIs, yet these indicators often remain divorced from actual work. For example, certain enterprises require security guards to perform patrols 8 times per shift. However, in actual operation, due to the extensive area of residential communities, completing patrol tasks necessarily sacrifices patrol quality, creating the phenomenon of “patrolling merely to clock in.” Second, excessive simplification. Some enterprises adopt a “one-size-fits-all” appraisal model, applying the same set of indicators across all positions. Taking customer service staff as an example, some enterprises assess them based on the number of complaints handled, ignoring differences in work difficulty, leading employees to compete for simple cases while evading complex ones. The deeper contradiction in the appraisal system concerns the inconsistency between the performance appraisal cycle and the service cycle. Property services are characterized by “daily accumulation coupled with periodic manifestation,” yet most enterprises adopt monthly or quarterly appraisals, making it difficult to accurately reflect long-term service performance. For example, facility maintenance work may appear “uneventful” on a daily basis, yet once a major failure occurs, the losses are significant. Short-cycle appraisals tend to overlook this “preventive” work value.

3.2 Market-Based Conflicts

3.2.1 Mismatch between Cost Push and Price Rigidity: The Game between Minimum Wage Adjustment and Property Fee Freeze

The human resource cost control of property enterprises is caught in the dilemma of “cost push coexisting with price rigidity.” On one hand, labor costs experience forced increases. In recent years, provinces have adjusted their minimum wage standards, with average annual increases ranging from 5% to 8%. Simultaneously, the social security contribution base has increased progressively. According to statistics, from 2020 to 2024, the per capita labor cost of property enterprises in Shandong Province increased by 28%, far exceeding the CPI growth rate during the same period. On the other hand, property fees remain difficult to adjust. According to the Pricing Mechanism for Property Management Fees, adjustments to property fees require consent from more than two-thirds of property owners. In actual operation, due to the collective action dilemma confronting owners, the success rate of fee adjustments remains extremely low. A survey of 50 residential communities in Jinan indicates that only 3 communities successfully increased property fees over the past five years, representing a success rate of merely 6%. This “top pressure coexisting with bottom support” situation forces property enterprises into an operational dilemma: if they do not increase fees, they face losses; if they increase fees, they face the risk of dismissal. In extreme cases, property fees for some older communities remain at levels established 10 years ago, while labor costs have more than doubled, forcing enterprises to reduce service content and service frequency, creating a vicious cycle of “cost push leading to service degradation resulting in fee collection difficulty leading to further cost pressure.”

More profoundly, the property fee pricing mechanism lacks flexibility. The current model of “government guidance prices coexisting with market-regulated prices” has not truly reflected market supply and demand. In first-hand communities, due to the high degree of organization among owners, property fees can be adjusted relatively smoothly; in second-hand communities, due to the difficulty of

owner organization, property fees often remain at historical levels. This “rigidity in adjustment” renders dynamic cost control difficult for property enterprises, forcing them to passively bear cost increases, ultimately affecting service quality and the healthy development of the industry.

3.2.2 Failure of Talent Expectation Management: The Game between Speculative Salary Hikes and the “Rational Return” Positioning of the Industry

Although the property industry has gradually formed a consensus on “rational returns” (Zhou & Sun), the talent market continues to exhibit obvious speculative impulses. Speculative behavior presents three new features: first, the phenomenon of salary bubbles. With the entry of leading property enterprises into the capital market, a “high salary poaching war” has emerged within the industry. A listed property enterprise in Qingdao recruited regional general managers at an annual salary of 1.5 million yuan, twice the industry average, resulting in instability within the management teams of surrounding enterprises. This “speculative” recruitment model drives up overall industry costs without bringing corresponding improvements in service levels. Second, deviation in the headhunting mechanism. Some headhunting companies, for the sake of commission, exaggerate candidate capabilities and embellish candidate backgrounds, leading to the “lemons problem” in talent introduction. A property enterprise in Jinan hired a general manager through a headhunting company at an annual salary of 800,000 yuan, but after assuming office, his management style proved incompatible with the corporate culture, ultimately leaving within six months and causing significant losses to the enterprise. Third, failure of expectation guidance. There exists a “signal disorder” in the industry’s talent expectation management. Some media outlets create anxiety by hyping concepts such as “property listing frenzy” and “capital pursuit,” leading to inflated talent expectations. A survey indicates that more than 60% of property management professionals believe their salary level falls below their own value, a ratio significantly higher than in other service industries.

The underlying reasons for the failure of expectation management include: first, the talent evaluation system remains unsound. There exists a general tendency toward “valuing experience while neglecting ability” within the property industry, and the absence of a scientific professional competence evaluation system leaves salary levels without an objective basis. Second, corporate brand building remains insufficient. The property industry has long occupied the bottom rung of the occupational reputation ladder, with low social recognition of practitioners directly affecting the career expectations of talents. Third, industry associations have not played effective roles and lack binding guidance on industry salary levels, leading to disorderly competition in the talent market.

3.3 Risk Potential

3.3.1 Transmission of Service Quality Risk: The Brand Crisis of Small and Medium-Sized Property Enterprises Penetrating the Reputation System

The service quality risk of property enterprises has broken through individual enterprise boundaries, exhibiting a transmission trend that penetrates the entire industry’s reputation system. This risk is transmitted to the brand system through three pathways: first, the chain reaction of service failure. Taking the case of a property company in Weifang, due to cost pressure, it reduced the number of cleaners and extended cleaning cycles, leading to declining community environmental quality, which subsequently triggered collective complaints from owners demanding dismissal of the property company. This vicious cycle of “service decline leading to owner dissatisfaction resulting in fee collection difficulty leading to further service decline” ultimately forced the enterprise to exit the community. More critically, the negative impact of a single enterprise spreads throughout the entire industry through word-of-mouth transmission. A survey indicates that 45% of owners believe that “property companies generally perform poorly,” a perception far exceeding the actual proportion of problematic enterprises. Second, legal disputes trigger credit crises. With the increase in owner rights awareness, property disputes have increased progressively. Statistics indicate that from 2020 to 2024,

the number of property contract disputes in Shandong Province increased at an average annual rate of 18%, with more than 60% caused by service quality issues. The surge in litigation not only increases enterprise operating costs but also affects their credit records, rendering financing and bidding more difficult. Third, public opinion amplification triggers systemic risk. In the era of social media, individual service incidents are easily amplified. A property conflict in Qingdao was exposed online, triggering widespread public discussion, affecting not only the enterprise involved but also public perception of the entire industry. This “domino effect” causes individual enterprise risks to evolve into industry systemic risks.

3.3.2 Structural Imbalance of Human Resources: The Vicious Cycle of High Turnover of Frontline Staff and Difficulty in Talent Cultivation

The human resource structure of property enterprises exhibits a typical “dumbbell-shaped” imbalance: relative shortage of senior management and technical talents, serious attrition among grassroots frontline staff, and a “hollowing out” phenomenon in middle-level management. This structural imbalance presents three major characteristics: first, accelerating attrition of grassroots staff. According to surveys, the average annual turnover rate of frontline staff in the property industry is 45%, with the turnover rate within three months of new employees reaching as high as 60%. Taking a property company in Liaocheng as an example, it recruited 120 security guards in 2023, with only 38 remaining by year-end, representing a retention rate of merely 31.7%. High turnover directly leads to service discontinuity, with owners facing new faces daily, making it difficult to establish trust. Second, insufficient middle-level management talent pool. Property project managers require both professional knowledge and management experience, resulting in lengthy cultivation cycles. According to statistics, cultivating a qualified project manager requires an average of 5-8 years. However, due to industry expansion, demand for project managers has surged, forcing many enterprises to resort to “promotion upon entry,” resulting in numerous inexperienced personnel assuming management positions. Third, difficulty in introducing high-end talents. The property industry has long occupied the bottom rung of the career choice ladder for college graduates, with fewer than 5% of property management graduates choosing to work in the industry. A university in Shandong maintains a property management major enrolling 60 students annually, yet fewer than 10 ultimately enter the property industry upon graduation. This “inferior talent selection” mechanism severely restricts the high-quality development of the industry.

4. Improvement Countermeasures

4.1 Flattened Organizational Structure: Building a “Headquarters-Cluster-Project” Dynamic Matching Mechanism

In response to the deep-seated contradiction between organizational redundancy and frontline flexibility in property enterprises, there exists an urgent need to construct a flattened organizational structure of “headquarters-cluster-project.” The core essence of this mechanism lies in achieving precise matching between management span and project needs, with specific implementation pathways including:

First, compress management levels. Break the traditional “headquarters-regional company-city company-project department” four-level management system and implement a “headquarters-cluster-project” three-level management model. Headquarters assumes responsibility for strategy formulation and standard setting, clusters undertake business supervision functions, and projects serve as profit centers responsible for frontline execution. Drawing reference from the reform experience of China Overseas Property, following implementation of flattening reform, the management span shortened from 1:4.8 to 1:7.2, decision-making efficiency increased by 35%, and management costs decreased by 18% (Chen&Wang). Second, implement dynamic personnel allocation. Based on project characteristics and workload, establish a staffing model comprising “basic staff

combined with flexible staff.” Basic staff account for 70%-80%, ensuring service stability; flexible staff account for 20%-30%, responding to peak demand. For example, in community security posts, implement a model of “fixed posts combined with mobile patrols,” with fixed posts responsible for key area monitoring and mobile patrols responsible for dynamic inspections, increasing personnel utilization by 25%. Third, promote the cluster management model. Adjacent projects (within a 3-kilometer radius) are formed into clusters, sharing management personnel and technical support. Surveys indicate that following implementation of cluster management, the average comprehensive utilization rate of engineering maintenance personnel increased from 55% to 82%, while the idle rate of management personnel decreased by 40%.

4.2 Scientific Business Outsourcing: Establishing a “Core + Non-Core” Differentiated Control System

In view of the quality risks accompanying business outsourcing, it is necessary to construct a differentiated control system covering the entire process, with the core being clear division between core and non-core businesses:

First, define the boundaries of core businesses. Security services, customer services, and facility maintenance directly related to core competitiveness should be included in the “core business list” and controlled by self-owned personnel. The proportion of self-owned personnel in core positions should not be less than 80%. For example, within the security team, key positions such as monitoring room operators and patrol team leaders must be held by self-owned personnel. Second, standardize the outsourcing service market. Establish an outsourcing supplier access system, conducting comprehensive audits of supplier qualifications, service capabilities, and compliance records. Implement a “shortlist + dynamic elimination” mechanism, retaining suppliers rated A and B while eliminating those rated D. Third, improve the outsourcing supervision mechanism. Establish an outsourcing service quality monitoring system, implementing real-time monitoring of key service links. For cleaning services, introduce an electronic quality inspection system with pass rates included in the settlement basis. For security services, install smart patrol systems to ensure patrol routes and frequencies meet standards. Research indicates that following implementation of whole-process supervision, outsourcing service qualification rates increased from 78% to 91%, while owner complaints decreased by 45%.

4.3 Diversified Employment Models: Building a “Formal + Flexible + Sharing” Human Resource Allocation System

In response to the mismatch between the rigidity of traditional employment models and the flexibility of service demand, property enterprises should actively explore diversified employment models:

First, implement a flexible employment model. For seasonal and peak demand, adopt flexible employment forms such as part-time employment and hourly work. For example, during winter snow removal, employ part-time cleaners on an hourly basis rather than increasing full-time staff. A property enterprise in Qingdao established a “flexible talent pool,” registering 300 flexible employees through cooperation with human resource service companies, increasing personnel utilization from 45% to 82% while reducing labor costs by 28%. Second, promote a skill-sharing model. For specialized positions such as engineering maintenance, implement regional sharing. Adjacent projects share an engineering team, with maintenance personnel performing rotational inspections across projects. A property group in Jinan established a “skill-sharing platform” where 45 senior technicians provide services across 23 projects, with annual per capita service area increasing from 35,000 square meters to 62,000 square meters. Third, explore an industry-education integration model. Establish deep cooperation with vocational colleges to implement an “order-based cultivation + rotational internship” talent cultivation model. A property enterprise in Shandong established a “property college” with local vocational schools, implementing a “2+1” cultivation model (2 years of school education + 1 year of enterprise internship), increasing the retention rate of new employees from 31.7% to 58.3% (Xu & Liu).

4.4 Digital Human Resource Management: Building a “Cloud Platform + Big Data + Intelligent Decision-Making” Management System

Property enterprises should seize the opportunities presented by digital transformation, utilizing technological means to enhance the refinement level of human resource cost control:

First, establish a smart scheduling system. Utilize the Internet of Things and big data technology to build a workload prediction model, achieving dynamic personnel allocation. A property company in Qingdao introduced an AI scheduling system, dynamically adjusting security patrol routes and cleaning frequencies based on real-time data such as traffic flow in different areas of the community and seasonal changes. Following system implementation, personnel utilization increased by 35%, with labor costs decreasing by 22% under the same service area. Second, promote the application of intelligent devices. Introduce smart devices such as cleaning robots and security patrol robots to replace simple, repetitive manual labor. A property enterprise in Jinan introduced 30 cleaning robots, reducing cleaning staff from 120 to 85, with annual labor cost savings reaching 1.8 million yuan. Meanwhile, the introduction of robots improved cleaning quality, with the cleaning pass rate increasing from 85% to 96%. Third, build a digital performance management platform. Establish a KPI + OKR composite assessment system, achieving real-time collection and analysis of performance data. Through a mobile APP, frontline employees can view task completion and performance scores in real time, enhancing the transparency and fairness of assessments. Research indicates that following implementation of digital performance management, employee satisfaction increased by 28%, while turnover rates decreased by 35%.

5. Conclusion

The property industry in Shandong Province is undergoing profound transformation, confronting multiple challenges including labor cost rigidity, organizational structure redundancy, performance appraisal failure, and service quality risks. The industry exhibits a pattern characterized by coexistence of smart transformation in core cities and cost pressure in county markets, with pronounced urban-rural disparities. Institutional barriers such as hierarchical organizational structures and performance appraisal deficiencies, alongside market conflicts between fee increase difficulties and minimum wage adjustments, have exacerbated the industry's operational imbalance. In terms of risk potential, the brand crisis of property enterprises has penetrated the reputation system, while structural imbalance in human resources continues to intensify. To address these issues, comprehensive measures must be implemented spanning institutional innovation, policy optimization, and risk prevention and control. The countermeasures proposed above—including flattened organizational structure reform, differentiated outsourcing control, diversified employment model innovation, and digital human resource management—hold significant implications for the healthy and sustainable development of the property industry in Shandong Province and throughout the country.

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